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Abstract 
 
There is international concern about the negative effects of delays in Criminal Justice 
Systems. Problems include the deleterious effects that delay can have on witnesses’ 
memory accuracy and witnesses’ ability to calibrate their memories accurately. Little 
empirical work has been conducted on these issues combined with item difficulty and 
the relationship between accuracy and confidence. This paper investigates these issues. 
21 witnesses were interviewed about an observed crime and required to answer 
lawyerly questions used in cross-examination relating to target items classified as 
‘easy’, ‘moderate’ and ‘difficult’, in terms of memorability. Participants were 
interviewed again, 6 months later. A 6 month delay significantly reduced memory 
accuracy for all levels of question difficulty. Within-subjects C-A relationships 
seemed to be relatively unaffected by delay; i.e. they tended to be positive for easy and 
moderate items, and negative for difficult items. Between-subjects C-A relationships 
were also positive for both easy and moderate items, but improved after 6 months; 
whereas C-A relationships for the difficult items remained negative and statistically 
insignificant following the 6 month delay. Delay can have a profound negative effect 
on witness accuracy that is not likely to be compensated for by improvements in C-A 
calibration.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has long been recognised, internationally, that delays in criminal justice systems are 
endemic and problematic (Samuels 1997; Manarin 2009). For example, in 1999, the 
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UK Home Office produced a protocol report in an attempt to reduce delays in the 
Youth Justice System (Home Office 1999); this was followed by two further reports 
focused upon this process element (Brown 2000; Ernst & Young Independent 
Consultants 1999). The latter report was originally borne from the Prison Service chief 
Martin Narey's review of delay in 1997. In New Zealand too, particular concern has 
been expressed about delays that child witnesses face in giving evidence in court 
(Hanna et al. 2010). Also, in recognition of the problems associated with delays, in 
2008, in Ontario, Canada, the Ministry of the Attorney General announced its ‘Justice 
on Target’ initiative to reduce delays in the province’s courts, which was deemed by 
many legal practitioners/scholars as long overdue (Manarin 2009). And, most recently, 
the judiciary in England and Wales have introduced a ‘Stop Delaying Justice’ 
initiative’ (see Riddle 2012), which aims to reduce delays in the system; it is intended 
that every magistrate, legal advisor and prosecutor will be trained in the requirements 
of the scheme. 
There are a number of reasons why the reduction of delays in the system might 
be beneficial. For example, delays may affect general confidence in the legal system, 
may cause protracted frustration, worry and distress to those involved, and may 
prevent victims of crime, and those associated with them, from ‘moving on’ (Hanna et 
al. 2010; Manarin 2009). However, perhaps most significantly, it has been argued that 
delay may have an adverse effect on the memory of those required to give evidence. 
As Manarin (2009:125) has emphasized, the most valuable commodity possessed by a 
witness called to testify at a criminal trial is his or her memory. This is because, when 
credibility is not an issue, accurate memory should help guide the trier of fact towards 
an accurate verdict; hence he says, ‘When a trial takes place without unreasonable 
delay, with all witnesses available and memories fresh, it is far more certain that the 
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guilty parties who committed the crimes will be convicted and punished and those that 
did not, will be acquitted and vindicated’.  
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Empirical evidence from the psychological literature suggests that concern about 
effects of delay on memory may be justified. For example, a variety of evidence 
indicates that people typically remember less about an event when recall takes place 
after a delay; moreover, the deterioration in recall performance as a result of delay is 
often observed even when participants have been given an earlier opportunity for 
recall (Flin, Boon, Knox and Bull 2011; La Rooy, Pipe and Murray 2005; Lipton 
1977; Turtle and Yuille 1994). 
  However, in courtroom situations, in particular, the perceived accuracy of 
witness memory is influenced fundamentally by the confidence that the witness 
displays in that memory. If a witness recalls a fact, but expresses no confidence 
whatsoever in the reliability of his or her memory for that fact, it is unlikely to be 
given any credence by a jury. Indeed, in the absence of other forensic information, 
confidence is the main indicator used by jurors to determine the accuracy of a 
witness’s memory (Wells 1985; Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson 1979; Wheatcroft, 
Wagstaff and Kebbell 2004). However, few studies have actually examined the effects 
of delay on the relationship between confidence and accuracy, and those that have, 
have produced conflicting results. For example, two studies found that repeated 
questioning of the same material increased confidence after 2 days (Hastie, Landsman 
and Loftus 1978), and after 3 weeks (Turtle and Yuille 1994), regardless of accuracy. 
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In contrast, Ryan and Geiselman (1991) reported that confidence decreased following 
repeat questioning after 1 week, but more so for incorrect than correct answers; i.e. 
there was better correspondence between confidence and accuracy over time. 
However, Granhag (1997) suggests that the positive effect after a short one week delay 
(1 week) on confidence-accuracy may have been more a function of making repeated 
confidence ratings per se, than the effects of the delay involved. In support of this 
interpretation, Granhag (1997) found that whether C-A relationships improved after a 
1 week delay rested crucially on whether participants were repeatedly tested, or tested 
for the first time after a week. If they were tested once shortly after the event, and 
then, a week later, given an opportunity to review their previous responses, and tested 
again, calibration improved; however, if they were tested for the first time after a 
week, it deteriorated. However, as yet, no work has examined the effects of repeated 
recall over a time period more akin to that experienced by witnesses in the Criminal 
Justice System, such as, six months or more. Even if repeated testing after a week can 
sometimes increase C-A relationships, will it still do so after 6 months?   
  Significantly also, as yet, no research has examined the possible differential 
effects of delay and memory on accuracy and confidence for different kinds of target 
items. As background to this, it can be noted that general findings regarding the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy in witness memory have been mixed. 
For example, a number of reviews have suggested that there is either no relationship, 
or only a small positive relationship between witness confidence and accuracy 
(Bothwell, Deffenbacher and Brigham 1987; Deffenbacher 1980; Fruzzetti, Toland, 
Teller and Loftus 1992; Penrod, Loftus and Winkler 1982; Sporer, Penrod, Read and 
Cutler 1995; Wells 1993; Wells and Murray, 1984). Nevertheless, other research 
suggests that C-A relationships vary according to a variety of factors, including the 
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method used to calculate the correlations. For example, in an attempt to explain 
negative findings, Smith, Kassin and Ellsworth (1989) suggested that researchers have 
concentrated too much on ‘between subjects’ confidence-accuracy relationships which 
involve calculating an average confidence and accuracy score for each participant, and 
then comparing the accuracy of confident witnesses to less confident witnesses; this 
produces a single between subject correlation for the group. Smith et al. suggest that 
higher correspondence between confidence and accuracy might be obtained by 
examining the relationships within participants’ own judgments by calculating a 
separate confidence-accuracy correlation for each participant; the individual 
correlations can then be averaged to produce a single mean ‘within subjects’ 
correlation for the group. Moreover, arguably, as within-subjects relationships provide 
a finer discrimination for each witness, they may be more meaningful in real life 
courtroom situations, especially when there are only a few key witnesses. 
Nevertheless, Smith et al., found, using a forced choice task, that both within- and 
between-subjects confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlations were still very low. 
Nevertheless, Perfect, Watson and Wagstaff (1993) repeated Smith et al.’s study with 
a control for guessing, and found that within subjects C-A correlations were higher 
than between subjects C-A correlations. 
In a further attempt to explain the variability in C-A findings, therefore, 
Kebbell, Wagstaff and Covey (1996) argued that a critical variable may be item 
difficulty. They suggested that, in laboratory studies, to avoid ceiling effects, 
researchers will tend to avoid ‘easy’ questions that more or less anyone will get right. 
However, little relationship will be found between confidence and accuracy when 
witnesses are asked to remember a relatively homogeneous pool of difficult or 
moderately difficult items (for example, items concerning peripheral detail such as 
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details of mailboxes or pictures); but if variance is increased through the inclusion of 
items that are easier to remember (for example, items reading the sex of the 
perpetrator, or whether it was night or day at the time), confidence-accuracy 
relationships may improve. A number of studies have found support for these 
predictions for a variety of stimulus conditions including eyewitness identification; 
they also indicate that C-A correlations tend to be higher for easy items generally, 
because easy items tend to be remembered in an ‘all or none’ fashion (Kebbell et al. 
1996; Lindsay, Read and Sharma 1998; Wheatcroft, et al. 2004). These findings 
suggest that any study looking at the effects of delay on memory in a legal context 
should examine, not only between and within subjects C-A correlations, but also the 
effects of using items of varying difficulty.  
A final consideration, as yet unexamined in research on the effects of delay on 
witness memory, is the use of what is known as the ‘lawyerese’ questioning style 
(Wheatcroft, Kebbell and Wagstaff 2001; Wheatcroft et al. 2004; Wheatcroft 2012). 
Cross-examination procedures have long been thought by the legal profession to be 
crucial for probing the accuracy of evidence obtained in the examination-in-chief, and 
to expose unreliable or dishonest witnesses (Stone 1988). However, despite an 
extensive psychological literature pointing to the dangers of leading questions in 
producing memory distortions (see, for example, Loftus 1979; 2003), a firm rationale 
has developed in legal culture whereby leading questions may be permitted during 
cross-examination (Keane and Fortson 2011; Wheatcroft 2012). Moreover, it is 
generally contended that asking questions containing false pre-supposition is a normal, 
useful, and effective procedure for verifying doubtful information and introducing new 
information (Hickey 1993); i.e. the admissibility of leading questions seems to be 
based upon the notion that they serve to calibrate or assess the memories of witnesses. 
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However, leading questions of the type asked during cross-examination are not only 
usually suggestive to a degree, but also tend to limit responses made to a two-
alternative forced choice alternative (i.e. yes/no), with a particular emphasis on the 
encouragement of affirmative responses (‘e.g. ‘The car was black, wasn’t it?’, ‘You 
would agree that ....’). This not only encourages ‘yea saying’, but gives witnesses little 
opportunity to elaborate or expand on their answers (Harris 1984; Kebbell, Deprez and 
Wagstaff 2003, Taylor 2004). Consequently, serious concerns have been raised with 
regard to basic paradigms of justice and fairness in that ‘lawyerese’ questions can 
suggest or compel responses not made to other less directive forms of questioning 
(Brennan 1995; Wheatcroft and Woods 2010; Wheatcroft and Ellison 2012). Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this particular kind of question style during interview has been 
demonstrated to have the most detrimental effect on confidence-accuracy relationships 
(Wheatcroft et al. 2004). Despite this knowledge, leading questions put in cross-
examination are still considered by lawyers as part of “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of the truth (Wigmore, 1940; p. 29); though see Wheatcroft, 
Caruso and Krumrey-Quinn - forthcoming 
In view of these considerations, to mirror more closely the operation of the 
legal system, the following study investigated the effects of a six month delay on 
memory, examining both accuracy and confidence, when participants were 
interviewed using ‘lawyerese’ questioning. 
 
 
Current Study   
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Given that in general memory tends to decline over time (Jonides et al. 2007) one 
might reasonably expect that both confidence and accuracy in memory to reduce over 
a long delay. However, it would not necessarily follow that the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy would decrease (i.e. C-A correlations would be reduced). 
Some studies have shown that, when participants are absolutely sure of a response, 
they invariably tend to be accurate (Kebbell et al. 1996; Wheatcroft et al. 2004). 
Arguably, such responses may be least likely to decline over time, not only because of 
the strength or salience of the original association, but also because they might be the 
most obvious candidates for rehearsal. Consequently, although there might be a 
decline in the overall number of correct responses over time, there might also be a 
corresponding increase in confidence-accuracy relationships as the distinction between 
the two types of response (accurate-confident, inaccurate-unsure) becomes more 
exaggerated (see also Ryan and Geiselman 1991). However, item difficulty might be a 
crucial variable here. For difficult items, where confidence may be low in the first 
place, further reductions in confidence and increasing ambiguity about memory for 
items, delay might intensify poor C-A correspondence. Thereby the research 
investigated the following hypotheses (H); H1: A declines in confidence will be found 
to be associated with delay; H2: A decline in accuracy will be found to be associated 
with delay; H3: C-A relationships will improve over time; H4: Poorer C-A 
correspondence will be observed for difficult items. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants  
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The participants were 4 males and 17 females drawn from an opportunity sample.  The 
mean age of the sample was 20.95 (SD = 5.45; range = 18-44). All participants were 
either students at the University of Liverpool or members of a research panel in the 
School of Psychology at the University.  
 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 
All participants were told that they were to observe a videotape of an event for a 
period of around 4-5 minutes, and afterwards, they would be required to answer some 
questions. All participants were then shown, individually, a five minute colour video 
depicting a criminal offence in which a woman at a bus stop is abducted and forced 
into a car. During the incident a gun is pointed at a witness. Following this each 
participant was required to complete a filler task for a period of five minutes, which 
involved reading unrelated material.  
  Participants were then interviewed individually by an interviewer who had 
undergone training to learn to modulate the voice consistently throughout the 
interviews. In the interview, participants were required to give answers to three sets of 
target items; 14 were designed to be ‘easy’, 14 ‘moderate’ and 10 ‘difficult’. Item 
difficulty was determined using accuracy data from previously published studies 
(Wheatcroft et al. 2001; Wheatcroft et al. 2004). However, unlike in most previous 
studies, the questions were phrased so as to replicate the manner in which lawyers 
conduct cross-examinations in court; i.e. they involved ‘lawyerese’ questioning. The 
phrasings were taken directly from the examination of several Crown Court 
transcripts. For example, for an easy question, instead of asking the witnesses, ‘did 
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two men carry out the attack on the victim?’, they were asked, ‘do you also remember 
that two men carried out the attack on the victim?’ Similarly, for a moderate question, 
instead of asking witnesses, ‘did the victim have long hair?’, they were asked, ‘you 
would agree that the victim’s hair was long?’ And, for a difficult question, instead of 
being asked, ‘would you say that this car had four doors?’, witnesses were asked, 
‘isn’t it also right this car had four doors?’. For answers to be correct, all required an 
appropriate affirmative or negative response (half affirmative and half negative within 
each category of item difficulty).  
As noted previously, questions that prompt simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses, but 
lean, in particular, towards the elicitation of affirmative responses, are typical of 
‘lawyerese’ questioning. However, lawyers also tend to target critical items that are 
associated with inconsistency both within and between witnesses’ statements. Given 
that critical items are items about which there may be some ambiguity, this will most 
likely to be the case for items that are difficult to remember. From the cross examining 
lawyers’ point of view, the strategy of targeting difficult items makes sense, as cross-
examiners are considerably less likely to influence the witness’ response to a very easy 
item, especially if the witness is perceived to be potentially harmful to the defence of 
an accused person. However, in doing so, lawyers will tend to target only a few critical 
items to prevent their strategy from becoming too transparent. Consequently, when 
wishing to cast doubt on the reliability of a particular witnesses’ testimony overall, 
they will tend target fewer difficult items and set these up as exemplars. This 
procedure was therefore adopted in the present study; i.e. there were fewer items in the 
‘difficult item’ category.  
Following each question, participants were also asked to rate their confidence 
in the response they had given on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 9, where (1) 
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represented ‘pure guess’ and (9) represented ‘absolutely certain’. All interviews were 
transcribed. At the end of the interview schedule, each participant was thanked for 
his/her participation and debriefed.  
 
 
Results 
 
Total accuracy (total number of items correct), mean confidence (mean scores on the 1-
9 Likert scale; where 1 represented ‘pure guess’ and 9 represented ‘absolutely certain’),  
within subjects confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlations (mean of the point-biserial 
confidence-accuracy correlations for each participant), and between subjects 
confidence-accuracy correlations (the Pearson’s correlation between total correct 
responses for each participant and mean confidence scores for each participant, for the 
group as a whole) were calculated. The overall results (i.e. easy, moderate and difficult 
items combined) are shown in Table 1.  
 
 
 
Table 1 Overall Results for Mean Total Accuracy, Mean Confidence, Mean 
Within-Subjects (w-s) C-A correlations, and Group Between-Subjects (b-
s) C-A correlations, at 5 minutes and 6 months. 
 
 
 
 
Accuracy 
 
 
Confidence
 
C-A (w-s) 
 
C-A (b-s) 
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Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis; *p<.05 
 
 
Preliminary analysis showed that overall accuracy was significantly lower at 6 months 
(t = 6.67, df = 20, p = .001). Also, between subjects C-A was found to be significant 
only at 6 months (r = .52, p<.02).  
  As there were unequal numbers of easy, moderate and difficult items, to 
explore the effects of item difficulty, the data for correct answers were transformed to 
percentage accuracy scores and analysed using a 3 X 2 mixed ANOVA 
(easy/moderate/difficult X 5 minutes/6 months), with repeated measures on the second 
factor.  
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Minute 
Delay 
(n=21) 
 
 
Overall 
 
 
 
 
27.95 
(2.16) 
 
 
6.29 
(1.00) 
 
 
.35 
(.14) 
 
 
.12 
6 
Month 
Delay 
(n=21) 
 
 
Overall 
 
 
 
 
23.48 
(2.79) 
 
 
4.55 
(1.25) 
 
 
.31 
(.15) 
 
 
.52* 
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Table 2 Mean Percentage Accuracy Scores, Mean Confidence Ratings, Mean w-s 
C-A Correlations, and Group b-s C-A Correlations, for Easy, Moderate, 
and Difficult items, at 5 minutes and 6 months. 
 
  
5 Minute Delay (n=21) 
 
 
6 Month Delay (n=21) 
  
 
 
Easy 
 
Mod 
 
Diff 
 
  
 
Easy 
 
Mod 
 
Diff 
 
% 
Accuracy 
 
  
 
92.52 
(6.57) 
 
 
74.15 
(10.47) 
 
 
46.19 
(19.36) 
  
 
80.61 
(13.39) 
 
 
65.65 
(21.62) 
 
 
30.00 
(22.76) 
 
 Conf 
 
 
  
7.49 
(.98) 
 
5.67 
(1.26) 
 
5.49 
(1.10) 
  
5.50 
(1.32) 
 
3.92 
(1.29) 
 
4.09 
(1.49) 
C-A (w-s)
 
 
 .40 
(.33) 
 
.47 
(.22) 
-.11 
(.33) 
 .43 
(.25) 
.40 
(.32) 
-.19 
(.37) 
C-A (b-s)  .28 .21 -.12  .50* .52** -.38 
 
 
          Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis; *p<.05, **p<.02 
 
As expected, given the data already analysed (see Table 1), a main effect was found 
for delay F(1,40) = 38.41, p<.001, η2p = .49; overall percentage accuracy was lower 
after  6 months (M = 58.75, SD = 19.12) than after 5 minutes (M = 70.95, SD = 12.13). 
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A significant main effect was also observed for item difficulty, F(1.36, 54.27) = 71.23, 
p<.001, η2p = .64 (n.b. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated; therefore, degrees of freedom were calculated using the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction). Further univariate F comparisons showed that easy (M = 86.56, 
SD = 1.63), moderate (M = 69.89, SD = 2.62) and difficult items (M = 38.09, SD = 
3.23) all differed significantly from each other (p<.05); i.e. easy items were answered 
most accurately, and difficult items, least accurately. These results further validated 
the selections of items. No significant interaction was observed, F (1.36, 54.27) = .44, 
p>.05, η2p = .01; i.e. delay did not differentially affect accuracy across the three item 
difficulty categories (see Table 2).  
A similar 3 X 2 mixed ANOVA was also conducted on the mean confidence 
scores. A main effect of delay was found (see Table 1), F(1,40) = 23.91, p<.001, η2p = 
.37; i.e. overall, confidence was lower after a 6 month delay. In addition, a significant 
main effect was shown for item difficulty, F(2,80) = 101.78, p<.001, η2p = .72; 
confidence was highest for easy items (M = 6.49, SD = .18). Further univariate F 
comparisons showed that easy items differed from moderate (M = 4.80, SD = .20) and 
difficult items (M = 4.80, SD = .20); though moderate and difficult items did not differ 
from each other (p>.05). No interaction was observed, F (2,80) = 2.26, p>.05, η2p = 
.05.  
 A further 3 X 2 on the within-subjects C-A correlations showed no main effect 
for delay, F(1,40) = .62, p>.05, η2p = .02 (see Table 1). However, there was a 
significant main effect for item difficulty, F (2,80) = 50.10, p<.001, η2p = .56. Further 
F comparisons showed that the mean correlations for easy (M=.42, SD=.29) and 
moderate (M = .43, SD = .27) items were significantly higher than those for difficult 
items; indeed, overall, the latter were negative (M = -.16, SD = .35). The correlations 
 
Delay and Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy 
15 
 
for easy and moderate items did not differ from each other (p>.05). The interaction 
with delay was not significant, F(2,80) = .38, p>.05, η2p = .01 (see Table 2). 
   As an alternative way of construing the within subjects confidence and 
accuracy data, for each participant, mean confidence in ‘incorrect’ answers score and a 
mean confidence in ‘correct’ answers, was calculated. Mean confidence in correct 
answers was compared to mean confidence in incorrect answers for the two levels of 
delay (5 Minutes/6 Months) for the easy, moderate, and difficult items using a 3 X 2 X 
2 mixed ANOVA (Easy/Moderate/Difficult X 5 Minutes/6 Months X Confidence 
Incorrect/Confidence Correct), with repeated measures on the last factor.  
 
 
Table 3 Within-subjects mean confidence in correct and incorrect answers for 
Easy, Moderate, and Difficult items at 5 minutes and 6 months 
 
 
  
    5 Minutes Delay (n=21) 
 
 
    6 Month Delay (n=21) 
 
TOTAL 
 
  
 
 
Easy 
 
Mod 
 
Diff 
 
 
 
Easy 
 
Mod 
 
Diff 
 
  Easy     Mod     Diff 
 
Conf 
Corr 
 
  
7.70 
(.95) 
 
6.37 
(1.29) 
 
4.70 
(1.83) 
  
6.04 
(1.31) 
 
4.66 
(1.32) 
 
3.41 
(2.21) 
 
   6.87       5.51      4.06 
  (1.41)     (1.55)   (2.11) 
Conf 
Inco 
 2.77 
(2.57) 
3.57 
(1.79) 
5.76 
(1.29) 
 3.15 
(1.59) 
2.38 
(1.37) 
4.15 
(1.75) 
   2.96       2.97      4.95 
  (2.12)     (1.68)   (1.73) 
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Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis. 
 
In addition to the ANOVA results already reported on confidence overall, confidence 
in correct answers was higher (M = 5.48, SD = 1.70) than confidence in incorrect 
answers (M = 3.63, SD = 1.84), F (1, 40) = 91.88, p<.001, η2p = .70. Also, a significant 
interaction was observed for item difficulty and confidence, F (2,80) = 64.12, p<.001, 
η2p = .62 (see Table 3). Further F analyses (p<.05) showed that, whereas confidence in 
correct answers was significantly higher than in incorrect items for both easy and 
moderate questions, there was a non-significant trend in the opposite direction for 
difficult questions. 
Also, a significant interaction was observed for item difficulty, confidence and 
delay, F (2,80) = 3.72, p<.05, η2p = .08 (see Table 3). To explore this interaction 
further, three 2 X 2 (Minutes/6 Months X Confidence Incorrect/Confidence Correct) 
were conducted on the data, for the easy, moderate and difficult items separately. Only 
easy items showed a Delay X Confidence interaction, F(1,20) = 14.64, p<.01; further 
analyses showed that, whereas confidence in correct answers at 5 minutes was 
significantly higher than confidence in correct answers at 6 months, there was no 
difference between confidence in incorrect answers at 5 minutes and 6 months 
(p>.05); the easy condition was the only condition not to show a decrease in 
confidence in incorrect answers after the delay. 
Between subjects C-A relationships were also calculated for each delay period 
for the three classes of item difficulty (easy, moderate, difficult; see Table 2). At 5 
minutes, no significant C-A correlations were found, and none differed significantly 
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from the others (p>.05). However, between subjects C-A correlations for ‘easy’, and 
‘moderate’ items were both found to be significant at 6 months (r = .50 and r = .52,  
respectively), whereas the correlation for ‘difficult’ items was not. Indeed, again, the 
latter was negative (r = -.38, p>.05). Moreover, although the latter correlations for the 
easy and moderate items did not differ significantly from each other (z = -0.081, 
p>.05) both were found to differ significantly from the correlation for the ‘difficult’ 
items (z = -2.85, p<.01 and z = -2.93, p<.02, respectively).  
Finally, out of 798 possible responses given by the 5 minutes interval group, 
285 were rated in terms of confidence as “absolutely certain”; of these, 89% were 
correct. For the 6 months interval group, 103 were rated as “absolutely certain” and, of 
these, 86% were correct. Overall, 87.5% of “absolutely certain” answers were correct, 
but there was a 23% drop in the number of such responses after 6 months. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In sum, as expected, the overall data showed that a 6 month delay before further 
questioning significantly reduced both overall accuracy and confidence in responding. 
However, the effects on C-A relationships were more complex. Within subjects C-A 
relationships seemed to be relatively unaffected by the delay; i.e. regardless of the 
delay interval, they tended to be positive for easy and moderate items (and 
significantly so for the mean confidence in correct and incorrect items analysis), but 
insignificant with a negative trend for difficult items (participants were more confident 
in their incorrect responses). Between subjects C-A relationships were also positive for 
both easy and moderate items, but were only significant after 6 months; whereas 
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between subjects C-A relationships for the difficult items remained negative and 
statistically insignificant following the 6 month delay. Taken together these results 
suggest that, whilst accuracy and overall confidence tend to decline over time, C-A 
relationships tend to remain positive for easy and moderate items. However, for 
difficult items, C-A relationships remain insignificant, with a negative trend, 
regardless of delay. These trends, however, seem to exaggerate over time for between 
subjects C-A correlations; i.e. the positive relationships improve, whilst the negative 
relationship for difficult items remains the same, or even worsens slightly. Given the 
high standard of proof that is required in a criminal prosecution, that being proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the significance of such correlates cannot be 
underemphasized. 
With regard to the between-subject C-A findings, further examination of the 
data showed more consistent evidence of greater sample variability in scores after the 
delay. For example, Tables 1 and 2 show larger accuracy and confidence score SDs for 
all levels of item difficulty after the delay. The trend for greater variability is also 
shown in the range scores; for example, for the overall data the range on accuracy after 
5 minutes is 8, after 6 months it is 12. Any increase in heterogeneity would allow 
higher between subjects correlations (Kebbell et al. 1996). Further examination of the 
raw data also showed a trend for participants who were generally accurate but not 
confident after 5 minutes, to become inaccurate and not confident after the 6 month 
delay, again raising the C-A relationship. One possible explanation for this is that 
people who ‘guess’ may be more likely to be correct in their guesses after 5 minutes 
because of the availability of partial memory traces. However, their guesses may 
become correspondingly inaccurate after 6 months as the weak traces decay 
(Weingartner and Parker 1984). In other words, the initially weak correlations for the 
 
Delay and Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy 
19 
 
easy and moderate items were not so much due to participants who were confident in 
incorrect answers, but those who were not confident in their correct answers. 
However, the converse would be the case for difficult items where the C-A correlation 
was initially negative. If anything, the effect would be worsened if those who were 
confident in wrong answers tended to maintain their confidence in these incorrect 
answers whilst those who were less confident in correct answers tended to forget their 
correct answers over time.  
The present results offer no support for previous findings indicating an 
increase in within subjects C-A correlations with repeated testing after a delay (for 
example, Granhag 1997; Ryan and Geiselman 1991). The most obvious difference 
between the present study and these others is that a longer time delay was used. 
Though also, unlike in Granhag’s (1997) study, participants were not given an 
opportunity to formally review their previous responses. A formal review of previous 
confidence ratings was not used here because of considerations of ecological validity. 
Of course, there are occasionally situations in the courtroom in which witnesses do 
have some opportunity to review what they have previously said, such as when a 
police officer is allowed to consult his or her notebook; however, this is not in any 
sense equivalent to a detailed formal review of the kind used by Granhag. It is possible 
that within-subjects C-A might also have improved in the present study if participants 
had been given an opportunity to review and change their previous judgments; 
however, the applicability of Granhag’s findings might rest crucially on the validity of 
the witnesses’ original C-A assessments. If witnesses’ original within subjects C-A 
judgments were poor or even negatively related, the effects of confirming their 
confident responses might result even greater calibration inaccuracy. However, the 
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effects of reviewing previous responses on C-A relationships for items of varying 
difficulty have yet to be investigated.  
Obviously, to be generalizable, the present findings need replication with 
larger samples, and over different stimulus conditions. Nevertheless, as far as they go, 
the present results suggest that one cannot make the general assumption that any 
decline in the accuracy of witnesses’ testimony over time can, in some way, be 
compensated for an increase and improvement in their C-A calibration. It appears that 
the effects depend critically on what is being recalled and how it is measured. The 
present results support previous evidence that delay generally has a negative effect on 
accuracy regardless of whether participants undergo repeated testing (Flin, Boon, 
Knox and Bull 1992; La Rooy, Pipe and Murray 2005; Lipton 1977; Turtle and Yuille 
1994), and add to this by showing that it occurs for all levels of question difficulty. 
Irrespective, whether prosecution offices would have the resources to conduct repeated 
witness interviews to gage memory for upcoming trials is questionable. However, the 
present results also suggest that after a 6 month delay, even with repeated testing, there 
is no improvement in within-subjects C-A relationships. Moreover, although there 
may be improvement in between-subjects C-A relationships, this is limited to items 
classed as easy and moderate. If anything, the calibration is made worse for difficult 
items, and there are no obvious grounds for arguing that difficult items will be any less 
forensically relevant in the courtroom. On the contrary, as mentioned previously, such 
items are more likely to be targeted by lawyers in the courtroom. It is possible that C-
A calibration might be further improved if witnesses were given an opportunity to 
formally review and change their previous responses; however, even notwithstanding 
practical limitations, it is not clear whether this might actually be detrimental for items 
that are difficult to remember. Another point to consider concerns the 23% drop in 
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‘absolutely certain’ responses after the 6 month delay in the present study. As such 
responses tend to coincide quite closely with accurate recall (Kebbell et al. 1996), any 
drop in their frequency is likely to indicate a decline in the quality of evidence 
provided. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taken together, for all practical purposes, the present results would support the views 
of those who have concerns that delays in justice systems can have a significant and 
deleterious effect on the witness’s ability to provide accurate testimony in court. The 
tendency that effects can be worsened over time if those who were confident in wrong 
answers remained confident in their incorrect answers later in court means that such 
evidence could critically influence outcomes.   
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